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altogether. But the notice is not for the benefit of the grantor
in the sense of notice to him. It is only for his benefit by granting
notoriety and publicity of the time, terms and place of sale, and
of the property to be sold, that bidders may be invited, competition
encouraged and a fair price obtained for the property. As to the
grantor, he is presumed to know that he is in default and his
property liable to sale at any time, and no notice to him is required.
* * * We are of the opinion that the sale of the trustee in.the
case under consideration was a lawful and valid sale, and that
complainants' bill should have been dismissed."
This argument, it seems to me, is unanswerable, and is so remarkably clear and satisfactory that nothing remains to be added.
The judgment is reversed and the petition dismissed.
NAPTON and ADAMS, JJ., dissented.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.

2

ASSU'iMSIT. See Vendor and Purchaser.
Waiver of Fraud and Action on Implied Contrat.-Wbere a person has unlawfully procured and sold securities belonging to another,

the principal and interest of which is capable of being ascertained by
computation, the owner from whom they have been taken, may waive
the fraud in the conversion of the bonds, and claim as on an implied
contract: Allen v. United States, 17 Wall.
CIVIL RIGHTS.

Colored Persons in Railroad Cars.-An Act of Congress passed in

1863, which gave certain privileges which it asked to a railroad corporation, enacted also that "no person shall be excluded from the cars
on account of color." Held, that this meant that persons of color
should travel in the same cars that white ones did, and along with them
in such cars: Railroad Company v. Brown, 17 Wall.
COLORED PEOPLE. See Civil Rights.
COMMON CARRIER.
Negligence.-Cannot stiptlate for exemption fiom responsibility for.
the negligence of himself or his servants: Railroad Co. v. Lockwood,
17 Wall.
The rule applies to the case of a drover, travelling on a stock train to
look after his cattle, and having a free pass for that purpose : .ld.
1 From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 17 of his Reports.

S From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 9 of his Reports.
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CONFEDERATE STATES.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Rebellion.
See Interest.

See Muinicpal Corporation.

CONTRACT.

Offer-May be rescindedbefore Acceptance unless there is Agreement to
contrary.--An offer to sell at a fixed price, whether accompanied with
an agency to sell to others or not, may be revoked at any time prior t.i
the acceptance of the offer, unless there is an express agreement (1n
good consideration to accept within a limited time, or when other
acts are done which the person making the offer consents to be bound
by : Stitt v. Huidekopers, 17 Wall.
An offer to take $40,000 in cash is not accepted so as to bind the
party by a contract which leaves the buyer at liberty to withdraw by
firtiiting a deposit of $10,000 or pay the remainder within sixty days
i.
Interpretationof-Not to be governed by what either party to the
contract understood or believed, unless such understanding or belief was
induced by the conduct or declarations of the other party: Bank v.
Kennedy, and Bailey v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall.
CORPORATION.

See Debtor and Creditor; Highway.

CURTESY.

See Equitable Conversion.

See Frauds,Statute of.
Stock and UJnpaid Subscriptions- Creditorshave right to requirePayment of-Set off.-Capital stock or shares of a corporation-especially
the unpaid subscriptions to such stock or shares-constitute a trust fund
for the benefit of the general creditors of the corporation, and this trust
cannot be defeated by a simulated payment of the stock subscription,
nor by any device short of an actual payment in good faith: Sawyer v.
I'oag, Assignee, 17 Wall.
A stockholder indebted to an insolvent corporation for unpaid shares,
cannot set-off against this trust fund for creditors a debt due him by the
corporatidn. The fund arising from such unpaid shares must be equally
divided anmong all the creditors : Id.
Equity will not aid Creditorto reach Debtor's Propertywithout special
Groundsfor its Interposition.-Equitywill not exercise its jurisdiction
to reach the property of a debtor applicable to the payment of his debts,
unless the debt be clear and undisputed, and there exist some special
circumstances requiring the interposition of the court to obtain possession of, and apply the property: Boardof Public Works v. Columbia
College, 17 Wall.
Evidence of Fraud.-Evidence of it not required to be more direct
nnd positive than facts and circumstances tending to the inference of it:
Rea v. Missouri, 17 Wall.
Where a creditor of B. levied on certain goods as B.'s, for which C.
interposed a claim of ownership, Held, That an intimate personal
and business relation between B. and C. having been shown, it was
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
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error toinstruct the jury that it was immaterial as to the ownership of
the goods how C. acquired his means, or whether his exhibit of them
was correct or not: Id.
EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
Naked Power of Sale in Executors- UntilActual Sale Land remahts
-Realty with ITIle in the Heirs, and Husbandof one of them is entitled to
curtey.-Where a naked power of sale is vested in executors with no
absolute direction to convert, but wholly discretionary not only as to the
time of sale but as to whether the sale shall ever be made, the land remiains laud until the sale actually takes place: Romaine v. Hendrickson's
Excutors, 9 C. E. Green.
Until the sale, where the land is not devised to the executors, the
title is in the heirs, and the husband of a daughter of the testator, dying
after her thther and before the sale is entitled to curtesy in her share oF
the land: L.
Such tenant by eurtesy and the son of such deceased daughter to whom
her said share of the land descended subject to the curtesy, are proper
parties to a bill against the executors to set aside a sale of testator's lands
on the ground of fraud, and for a discovery and account: l.
Under a naked power of sale where the land is not devised to the
executors, but till the sale the title is in the heirs, a sale to a pretended
purchaser but really to themslves is not a conversion of the lands, and
does not affect the rights of the heirs : Id.
EQUITY.

See Debtor and Creditor; Fraud; !lrust.

Damagesfor taking of lands-If a change in the amount of damage
done to lands takes place after report of Commissioners equity will relieve.-Under an award by commissioners appointed to appraise and
estimate the valie of lands about to be taken for a railroad, and assess
the damages the presumption of law is that damages were awarded to the
owner for all injuries that might result to him. For injuries not considered by the commissioners, no adequate remedy can be had at law:
Carpenter v. Easton & Amboy Railroad Co., 9 C. E. Green.
Where, at the time of making an award for damages for land taken by
a railroad company, the representatives of the company stated to the
commissioners that they would cross certain low land by an iron bridge
resting upon posts, and would protect and keep clear a lane, the only
convenient means of communication between different parts of a farm,
but subsequently the company determined to construct a high embankment, and have commenced it, and intend to fill in and cut off the lane
entirely,-it clearly appearing that the commissioners did not consider
the embankment in the estimate of damages,-equity will restrain the
company from filling up the lane, until compensation is made to the
owner of the lands: Id.
The Court of Chancery has power to determine in such case, the amount
of compensation: Id.
The original commissioners were appointed to estimate and report a
proper compensation : Id.
ESTOPPEL.

See Municipal Corporation.
FIXTURES.

Tests as to what c mstitutes.-Whether property ordinarily treated as
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personal goes with the realty as fixtures or otherwise, is not determined
by its capability or incapability of being detached and removed from the
premises without injury to the freehold, but depends upon the particular
circumstances of the case: Quimby v. Manhattan Cloth and Paper
Company, 9 0. E. Green.
As between mortgagor and mortgagee, when the fixture appertains to
the real estate, is necessary for its enjoyment, and is permanently attached to the freehold, it will be treated as realty : 11.
The permanency of the fixture depends upon the motives and intentions
of the party attaching it. If attached for temporary use with the intention of removing, the mortgagor may remove it; Aliter, if attached
for the permanent improvement of the fieehold : Id.
That fixtures were called personal property in the deed to the mortgagor for the premises, and a bill of sale therefor accompanied the
deed, cannot affect their character as between mortgagee and mortThe three requisites for determining the character of a fixture as
realty or otherwise are 1. Actual annexation to the realty or something
appurtenant thereto. 2. Application to the use or purpose to which
that part of the realty with which it is connected is appropriated. 3.
The intention of the party making the annexation, to make a permatient accession to the freehold : Id.
FORMER ACTION. See Judgment.
Effect when not strictly Res Ajadicata.-Although a formersuit about
the same subject-matter as a later one may not operate strictly as resjudicata, yet it may well be referred to when it was heard on the scene
of the transaction complained of, and when it relates to a transaction
fbrty years old, as an element by which a conclusion at a later day in
accordance with its result may be assisted: Hume v. Beale's Executrix,
17 Wall.
Judgment without Personal Service not Evidence outside of State autlorizing it.-A personal judgment, rendered in one state against several
parties jointly, upon service of process on some of them, or their voluntary appearance, and upon publication against the others, is not evidence outside of the state where rendered of any personal liability to
the plaintfff of the parties proceeded against by publication : Board of
Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall.
FRAUD.

See Debtor and Creditor.

Setting aside Judicial Proceedings for-Laches.-Where a bill is
filed by a third party, to set aside, as fraudulent, completed judicial proceedings, regular on their face-the bill being filed five years after the
judicial proceedings which it is sought to set aside have been completed
-the cause of so considerable a delay should be specifically set out.
And if ignorance of the fraud is relied on to excuse the delay, it should
be shown specifically when knowledge of the fraud was first obtained:
Harwood v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Fraudulent Conveyance.-Under the Statute of Frauds of Missouri,
a sale of household furniture in a house occupied jointly by vendor and
VOL. XXII.-22

ago
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vendee, both using the furniture alike, and there being no other change
of possession than that, the vendor after going around with the vendee,
and looking at the furniture and agreeing on the price, tuirned it over
to the vendee, and executed a bill of sale before a notary, both parties
then, after the sale, occupied the house and used the the furniture exactly
as before, is void as against the vendor's creditors: Allen v. Massey, 17
Wall.
HIGHWAY.
of Townshi authorities to
company-Right
by
Railroad
Inferference
invoke aidfroma Courts.-Township authorities have a special interest in
the highways, beyoad that of the public at large, and may properly file
a bill, in their corporate name, to restrain a threatened destruction of a
highway within its limits: Township of Greenwich v. The Easton& Amboy R. R. o., 9 C. E. Green.
A grant of power, in laying out and constructing a railroad, to change
the location of any public road, if the company shall find it necessary,
and to occupy such portions of the road as they may deem necessary or
expedient ;-the company in such case, to cause the changed portion of
such public road, to be reconstructed at their own expense, in as perfect
a manner as the original road, does not authorize the diversion of an ancient highway, because the company find it to their pecuniary advantage
or convenience to make such diversion. The diversion must be necessary: Id.
A grant of new and extraordinary power to a private corporation in
contravention of the established rights of the public must be construed
with a reasonable strictness: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Equitable Conversion.

INFANT. See Master and Servcnt.
Contributory Fault no Bar.-Need not himself have been free from
fault to entitle him to recover damages resulting from the fault of another: Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall.
INTEREST.
Lexfori.-Where allowed, not under contract, but by way of damages,
the rate must be according to the lex fori: Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall.
See Former Action.
Is Merger of Cause of Action.--Judgment on a note or contract operates as a merger of it, and when the judgment is binding personally, it
can be introduced in evidence and relied on as a bar to a second suit on
the note: Eldred v. Bank, 17 WalL
JUDGMENT.

LAcBEs.

See Fraud; Trust.
MANDAMUS.

To Public Offwers-Not valid againstSuccessor in Offlice.-7Against an
-officer of the government, in the absence of statutory provision to the
.contrary, abates on his death or retirement from office. His successor
in oice cannot be brought in by way of amendment of the prdceeding.
or on an order for the substitution of parties: United States v. Boutwell,
.17 Wall.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.

Fellow Servant-Ifant of tender years not within the Ordinary rule.
-The rule that the master is not liable to one of his servants for injuries resulting from the carelessness of another, when both are engaged
in a common service, although the injured person was under the control
and direction of the servant who caused the injury-whether a true rule
or not-has no application when one of the persons employed and injured
is a boy of tender years, employed as a helper under the superintendence
of a full-grown man of mature years, and required by the master to obey
his orders: Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall.
MERGER.

See Judgment.

MORTGAGE.

Mortgagee assigning mortgagewith guarantee-Billin equity to foreclose-Remedy at law or assignor'sguarantee.-Amortgagee who assigns
the mortgage, and guarantees the debt, is a proper party in a suit to foreclose the mortgage, and a personal decree may be made against him for
any deficiency: Jarman v. Wisevall, 9 0. E. Green.
That the liability of such guarantor cannot take effect until the remedy
against the mortgagor shall have been ethausted is no objection to the
jurisdiction of this court. The decree in such case would be made to
conform to the liability : Id.
That the guarantor is liable at law by direct and express covenant for
the payment of the deficiency and his liability therefore. a mere legal
one, will not deter the court under the statute from exercising jurisdiction : 11.
Motion to amend a final decree to make it personal against a guarantor of a mortgage dobt, for a deficiency refused, under the circumstances
of the case, where the complainant's remedy at law was adequate: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

MunicipalAuthorities have authority to bind Property-Ownersfor improvements-But having made a Contractfor such Improvements they are
in some sense trusteesfor such owners, and Equity willprevent a Sacrifice
of the latter'sInterests-Standingby without objection is evidence of assent
by the property-holders- Controlof courts over .Hunidpal action- Contractsultra vires.-3unicipal authorities in the making of street improvements authorized by law to be made atthe expense of the owners of lands
to be benefited thereby, are to a certain extent the agents of such owner.
Contracts lawfully made at the discretion of the authorities are binding
upon the landowners, though injudiciously made; but the owners are
entitled to have such contracts performed substantially in all things according to their terms, and the authorities have no power to dispense
with such performance to the gain of the contractor and the loss of the
property-owners: Schumm, v. Seymour, 9 0. E. Green.
If official authorities are about to accept and pay under a contract, for
what in substantial and important respects, is not according to the contract, so that the difference enures to the benefit of the contractor at the
expense of the owners, the authorities in so doing are guilty of a breach
of trust which amounts to a fraud. The proper and only remedy in such
case is in equity: Id.
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If the landowners stand by and see the officials pay the contractor
they can have no relief against the assessment. But a court of equity
will enjoin such wrongful payments, and in so doing does not interfere
with the exercise by municipal corporations of the legislative or discretionary powers conferred by their charters: Id.
In the exercise by municipal corporations of their legislative or discretionary powers they are beyond the control of the courts; but after
such powers have been exercised, and the authorities are about to pay
the contract price for street improvements with the money of the landowners, they are not acting in a legislative capacity, but in the capacity
of agents amenable to the courts: I .
Where a contract made by street commissioners under charter authority, requires that paving shall be done in accordance with specifications,
but the work is not so done, and the departure from the contracts results
in a large saving to the contractor, the payment of the stipulated price
will be restrained, even though the substituted work be equally good
with what the contract required: Id.
The affairs of a corporate body can be transacted only at a corporate
meeting. Its legislative and discretionary powers can be exercised only
by the coming together of the members who compose it, and its purposes
or will can be expressed only by a vote embodied in some distinct and
definite form. Their only existence is as a board, and they can do no
valid act except as a board, and such act must be by ordinance or resolution, or something equivalent thereto : Md.
Under a charter investing commissioners with powers over street improvements, and expressly enacting that no wprk or materials for the improvement of streets shall be contracted for, unless specifications therefor
and proposals for doing such specified work, or furnishing such specified
materials, have been fully advertised, a property-owner cannot be assessed
for any part of the cost of work and materials furnished upon the order
of individual commissioners, and without any bargain as to price or other
particulars between the commissioners in their lawful capacity and the
contractor, and without advertisements or competitive bids : Id.
Public policy requires such restrictive enactments to be rigidly enforced, and the consequences resulting from the void character of the
contracts they prohibit must be the same in equity as at law: Id.
It is a general and fundamental principle of law that all persons contracting with a municipal corporation must, attheir peril, inquire into the
power of the corporation or its officers to make the contract. And a
contract beyond the scope of the corporate powers is void: Id.
When municipal officers, in the making of street improvements exercise powers not conferred by charter, they are in no sense agents or
representatives of property-owners, and no liability attaches to the latter
from mere inaction or silence, for improvements so made. The doctrine of
equitable estoppel has no place in a case where usurped powers have
been exercised by municipal officers, who in so doing were contravening
public policy, as well-known as positive law: _I5.
Where officials are acting within the terms of their delegated powers,
though they may be acting carelessly, negligently, or in culpable betrayal of their trust, they are the agents of those whose property is liable
to be charged, and if the latter acquiesce in or fail to interpose when
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the negligent or culpable conduct of their agents is open to their view,
they will not afterwards be allowed to set it up when the effect of so
doing will be to subject innocent parties to the burden that would otherwise hll upon themselves: Id.
Controlof Streets by Legislature- Grant of Franchiseto lay Railroad
Tracks in Street- Consent of Property-holders- Constitutional.aw-EstOlppel by knowledge and failure to object while work being done.-The
legislature has full power to authorize the laying of railways in the
streets of a city. And a company having such chartered authority, and
having complied with all the conditions of their charter, are entitled to
operate their railway without other impediment or restriction on the
part of the city than such as they may have voluntarily submitted themselves to, or as may arise from reasonable municipal regulations : Paterson & PassaicHorse Railroad Co. v. fayor of Paterson and Others, 9
0. E. Green.
For the purposes of consent required by the charter of a street railroid company to be obtained from property-owners along the proposed
route of the railway, before it can be laid, the city corporation is to be
regarded as the owner of an open public square dedicated to the public
use for ever, whether the fee be in the corporation or not, or in whomsoaver it may be : Id.
A grant of authority to lay and operate a railway in the streets of a
city without requiring the consent of owners of property along the
route is lawful. It does not conflict with that clause of the constitution
requiring compensation to be first made : Id.
Under a charter requiring thatbefore a railway should be constructed
in the streets of a city, the consent of a majority of the propertyowners along the proposed route, and of the city should be first obtained,
the consent of a majority of the property-owners is not a condition precedent to the consent of the city. The consents are independent, and
i, is immaterial which is first obtained : Id.
lMehl, That the charge of fraud upon which the city claimed the
right to withdraw its consent to laying the railway was not sustained, and
that the city having a knowledge of the facts at the time of' passing the
ordinance giving such consent were not in a position to allege misrepresentation : Id.
IJld, also, that the acquiescence of property-owners whose consent
is necessary as a condition precedent to the exercise of the franchise
granted the company, in standing by and seeing the company construct
and operate the road under a claim of right, will be regarded as evidence
of consent: Id.
NATIONAL BANKS.

Right of Receiver to sue in his own Name.-A receiver appointed
by the comptroller of the currency under the fiftieth section of the
National Banking Act, may sue for demands due the baunk in his
own name as receiver, or in the name of the bank : .Bank v. Kennedy,
17 Wall.
In order to sue for an ordinary debt due the bank, he is not obliged
to get an order of the comptroller of the currency. It is a part of his
official duty to collect the assets : Id.
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NEGLIGENCE.

See Common, Carrer; Husband and Wife; Infant;
Master and Servant.
NOTICE.

Duty of Inquir.-Where inquiry is a duty, the party bound to make
inquiry is affected with all the knowledge which h'e would have got had
he inquired: Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall.
President's Proclamation-Pablication in, Newspapers.-Through
newspapers not necessary to give effect to a proclamation of the President. It takes effect when signed and sealed !withthe seal of the United
States, officially attested : Lapeyre v. United'States, 17 Wall.
PARTNERSHIP.

Bill in Equity by representativesof Deceased-How Survivors are to be
charged with PartnershpAssets.-Where a person sues in chancery as
administrator of a deceased partner, to have an account of partnership
concerns, alleging in his bill that he is the sole heir of the deceased
partner, the fact that he is not so does not make the bill abate fbr want
of necessary parties: Moore v. Huntington, 17 Wall.
On a bill by the representatives of a deceased partner against surviving partners for an account, these last should not be charged with
the sum which the partnership assets at the exact date of the deceased
partner's death were worth, but only with such sum as by the use of
reasonable care and diligence they could get for them in closing the
partnership business: Id.
Nor be charged with the value of real estate of the partnership, the
title to which is left by the decree charging them, in the heirs of the
deceased partner : Id.
POWER.
RAILRoAD.

See Equitable Conversion.
See Common Carrier; Highway.
REBELLION.

Investment by Trustee in Confederate Bonds-Acts of States during
Oivil Wr.-To a suit by legatees to compel an executor to account for
moneys received by him from sales of property belonging to the estate
of his testator, and to pay to them their distributive shares, it is no
answer for the executor to show that he invested such funds in the bonds
of the Confederate government by authority of a law of the state in
which he was executor, and that such investment was approved by the
decree of the Probate Court having settlement of the estate : Hlorn v.
Lockhart, 17 Wall.
The acts of the several states in their individual capacities, and of
their different departments of government., executive, judicial and legislative, during the war, so far as they did not impair or tend to impair
the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens
under the Constitution, are, in general, to be trefted as valid and binding: Idl
,Judicialproceedings affecting the Rights of Parties on other side of
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the Army Line during the Civil War.-Judicial proceedings during the
war of the rebellion, within lines of the Federal army, by a private
person on a mortgage, ending in a judgment and sale of mortgaged
premises, against one who had been expelled by the military authority
of the United States into the so-called Confederacy, and who had no
power or right to return to his home during the rebellion, held null, and
a judgment which refused to vacate them reversed: Dean v. Nelson, 10
Wallace 172, affirmed: Lasere v. Rochereau, 17 Wall.
SET-OFF.

See Debtor and Creditor.

Liquidation of.-A claim by the United States for the proceeds of
bonds unlawfully procured from it by a person insolvent, and sold, consisting of the principal and interest of the bonds, and being thus capable
of ascertainment, is sufficiently liquidated, though it have never been
judicially determined, to be subject of set-off: Allea v. United States,
17 Wall.
SHIPPING.

.,Ncessaricsin a ForeignPort.-Where advances are made to a captain
in a foreign port, upon his request, to pay for necessary repairs or supplies to enable his vessel to prosecute her voyage, or to pay harbor dues,
or 1br pilotage, towage, and like services rendered to the vessel, the presumption of law, in the absence of fraud or collusion, is that they are
imade upon the credit of the vessel as well as upon that of her owners,
and the presumption can be repelled only by proof that the master was
in possession of funds applicable to the expenses, or of a credit of his own
or of the owners of his vessel upon which funds could be raised by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, and that the possession of such funds
or credit was known to the party making the advances, or could readily
have been ascertained by proper inquiry: The Emily Souder, 17 Wall.
Liens fohr such advances have priority over existing mortgages to
creditors at home : Id.
SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES.

Jurisdiction to review Judgments ofState Courts.-The Supreme Court
has jurisdiction by writ of error to review the judgment of a state court
when the writ is issued to the highest court of the state in which a decision of the case could be had, even if that court be an inferior court
of the state : Miller v. Joseph, 17 Wall.
Uonstruction of State Statutes.-In the construction of the statutes
of a state, and especially those affecting titles of real property, where
no federal question arises, this court follows the adjudications of the
highest court of the state, whatever may be the opinion of this court
of its soundness: Walker v. State Hfarbor Commissioners, 17 Wall.
TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.

See Eguity.

TRUST.

Resulting-A resulting trust of land does not arise in favor of one of
two joint purchasers, unless his part is some definite portion of the
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whole, and what money he pays is paid for some aliquot part of the property, as a fourth, third, or a moiety. Nor can it arise in any case for
more than the money actually paid ; nor be created by advances or funds
furnished after the time when the purchase is made: Olott v. Bynum,
17 Wall.
Trustee's Sale.-A deed of trust with power of sale (a deed. therefore, in the nature of a mortgage), provided that money should be paid
in three equal instalments, and that in defhult of payment of any one
"that may grow due thereon," all the mortgaged premises might be
sold and a deed of the premises made to the purchaser, and that it
should be lawful for the trustee "out of the money arising from such
sale to retain the principal and interest which shall then be due."
rendering the overplus to the mortgagor. Hel (theproperty being incapable of advantageous sale in parts), that when one instalment fell
due, the trustee had a right to sell, and though there was a surplus
above what was necessary to pay the instalment due, yet that the trustee
might reserve the whole and apply it to the residue of the mortgage
debt: Id.
A sale of a large and valuable property under a deed of trust in the
nature of a mozkgage, held under the proofs to have been properly made
in a body, and fbr cash alone, and on the promises themselves, though
they were in a remote part of Virginia: Id.
Bill founded on alleged Breach-Laches.-A bill by cestni gue trust
was dismissed, where all the ground of action had occurred between
twenty and thirty years, and the alleged breach of trust had taken place
thirty-seven years before the bill was filed, and the trustee was dead.
This, although the cestuis que trust were women, and the trustee a lawyer,
who had married their half-sister: Hume v..Beale's .Becutrix,17 Wall.
See Frauds,Statute of.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Vendee taking 1Bossession under Articles of Sale not liablefor Use and
Occupation.-Onewho enters into possession of land in virtue of an
agreement that he is to be a purchaser of it, cannot be held liable for
use and occupation, if the purchase be concluded: 0arpenterv. United
States, 17 Wall.
Vendor's Lien.-Exists as against a purchaser, having notice of the
deed, in those states where such a lien prevails (as in Texas), when the
deed shows on its face that the consideration is yet to be paid : Cordora
v. Hood, 17 Wall.
Taking a note from the vendee with security, though presumptively
an abandonment of the lien, not so absolutely. The presumption may
be rebutted : Id.
The vendor's testimony, if positive, sufficient to do this: Id.
Part payment of such a note-the note being for the payment ot all
and every part of the purchase-money so long as it renmains unpaid-and
taking a new note payable at the same time and in the same way as the
original note, and the destruction of this last, does not displace the lien:
Id.
WAR. See Rebellion.

